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In Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy, Samir Haddad advances two closely related 
theses concerning the idea of democracy to come (démocratie à venir), which Jacques Derrida 
developed in a number of different works, including most prominently Specters of Marx, The 
Politics of Friendship, and Rogues. Haddad’s first thesis is descriptive: he argues that we miss 
what is most important and original in the idea of democracy to come if we understand it 
primarily with reference to the future. Of course given the name of the idea—à venir, to 
come, is very closely related to l’avenir, the future—it is not difficult to understand why the 
“dominant tendency” in the literature has been to favor the future-oriented interpretation. 
But Haddad believes that this interpretation is “quickly reduced to a simple passivity or 
utopianism in the face of what happens” (3). We can understand the idea in a more 
theoretically and practically fruitful way, he thinks, if we emphasize the relation of 
democracy to the past that it cannot avoid having to inherit. Haddad’s second thesis is 
explicitly normative: inheritance is not only factually unavoidable for democracies, but it is 
also obligatory. Democracy to come, he thinks, entails an “injunction to inherit from the 
past in a very particular way” (3). I believe Haddad makes a strongly compelling case for his 
first, descriptive thesis. Indeed, his reinterpretation of the idea of democracy to come in 
terms of inheritance is enough by itself to make this book necessary reading for anyone with 
an interest in Derrida’s political philosophy. Haddad’s argument for the second, normative 
thesis is less convincing in my opinion. In what follows, I will begin by summarizing the 
argument for the descriptive thesis. This, it should be said, is the thesis that Haddad seems 
most concerned to defend in Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy; all of the chapters but one 
are devoted primarily to it. Next, I will focus specifically on the argument for the normative 
thesis, which is developed explicitly in the fourth chapter. Finally, given the thematic focus 
of SCTIW Review, and in order to illustrate both the importance and the practical difficulties 
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of democratic inheritance, I will examine Haddad’s conception with reference to the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. 
Haddad devotes the first chapter to describing the structure of Derridean aporias. This 
chapter will be extremely valuable for readers who are not well versed in Derrida’s thought, 
or for readers who are only familiar with his earlier work. Readers who already have a firm 
grasp of Derrida’s later work will find it less essential, but nonetheless valuable as a clear, 
nicely organized summary of the key points. The basic structure of aporia is common to 
most of the ethical and political concepts whose logic Derrida articulates in his later work, 
including hospitality, responsibility, forgiveness, the gift, and of course democracy. In each 
of these cases the ethical term, in order to be what it is, must be understood as 
unconditional. Hospitality, which is the example Haddad uses to illustrate the structure of 
aporia in general, must be understood as “an absolute openness, a welcome that allows for 
the coming of any other, without question or imposed limitations” (12). If hospitality were 
not unconditional in this way—if it were reducible to a set of rules setting out the conditions 
under which persons were to be welcomed—then it would not be hospitality. We do not 
consider the restaurant owner who chooses to serve an African American, for example, as 
exercising the virtue of hospitality, since the law requires him to do so. But on the other 
hand, the unconditionality that is the condition of possibility for hospitality is also the 
condition of its impossibility: to be absolutely welcoming of the other, without questions or 
limitations, would be to undermine the conditions under which one could be hospitable at 
all, since the gesture of welcoming presupposes a chez-soi, a place of one’s own. In order for 
hospitality to be more than a utopian ideal, then, it must be regulated by conditional rules. 
The aporia, or impassability, consists in the fact that the mutually dependent necessary 
conditions are also mutually contradictory. 
The first chapter on the structure of aporias prepares the way for the key insight that 
gets Haddad’s own argument underway, which is that all engagements with aporias take the 
form of inheritance (22). This is a bold interpretive claim. It is not at all obvious that the idea 
of inheritance plays a major role in Derrida’s understanding of political action, and of 
democracy in particular. In defending his interpretation, Haddad relies heavily on two texts: 
Specters of Marx and For What Tomorrow. I have to admit that when I first read Haddad’s book, 
I thought he had placed entirely too much interpretive weight on scattered, inessential 
passages from these texts. His argument made me curious enough to go back and reread 
Specters, though, and what I found was abundant confirmation of his interpretation. What 
Derrida shows, and what Haddad makes central to his own argument, is that the legacies 
within which we are situated are heterogeneous. As finite beings, we find ourselves 
responsive to them always already; we cannot not take them up in some way. But since 
“there are multiple voices” in every legacy, and since “these cannot be combined into a 
single, stable, unified whole,” the act of taking up can never be a simple repetition (24). To 
inherit in this sense is to choose which elements of the tradition to carry forward and which 
to de-emphasize. And this means that we cannot inherit without introducing a difference, 
without relaunching the tradition otherwise (29). The condition of a legacy’s being what it is, 
in sum, is its openness to being taken up in ways that will render it different from what it is. 
The political tradition that is most explicitly open to forms of inheritance that will 
relaunch it otherwise—and indeed perhaps radically otherwise—is democracy. This, in part, 
is why Derrida speaks of democracy to come. The openness of democracy has its basis in 
the value that democratic societies place on freedom: “Insofar as each person in this 
democracy can lead the life (bion) he chooses, we find in this regime, this politeia—which, as 
we will see, is not quite a regime, neither a constitution nor an authentic politeia—all sorts of 
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people, a greater variety than anywhere else.”1 There is no Platonic Form of democratic 
society, then; what a particular democracy is is what its citizens freely decide it will be. This 
formlessness opens democratic societies to an extraordinary range of possibilities of 
inheritance, including the possibility of the rejection of democracy itself. The legacy of 
democracy can be inherited, i.e., relaunched, in ways that maintain the necessity for 
continued inheritance or in ways that reduce its scope, rendering inheritance as close as 
possible to mere repetition. 
One of the points that Haddad is most concerned to establish in the book is that Derrida 
endorses a very specific manner of inheriting, one that heightens the tensions between the 
mutually conditioning and mutually contradictory terms of the aporias he inherits rather than 
trying to work out a kind of compromise between them. Indeed Haddad argues that 
deconstruction is synonymous with inheritance understood in this way (37). The fifth 
chapter, devoted to Derrida’s Politics of Friendship, serves as a case study. In that book, 
Derrida follows an influential strand of Western philosophical reflection that conceives the 
political bond in terms of friendship. Each major thinker who advances this tradition of 
thought makes use of an aporetic conception of friendship. On the one hand, friendship is 
necessarily between equals who stand in relations of symmetry and reciprocity, but on the 
other hand there is an ineliminable asymmetry in all of these relations. Aristotle, for example, 
argues that true friendships of virtue must be between equals; it is this kind of friendship 
that holds states together and that serves as the model for justice.2 But on the other hand, 
Aristotle insists on a certain asymmetry between the active and passive roles within the 
relation: it is better, he thinks, to love than to be loved. The tension between equality and 
inequality, symmetry and asymmetry, has consistently been covered over in Western political 
thought by the compromise notion of fraternity: brothers are bound together as equals in a 
quasi-natural way within the family, but also stand in relations of rivalry and asymmetry. 
Haddad argues convincingly that Derrida inherits this political tradition precisely by refusing 
the compromise of fraternity and by heightening the tensions within the concept of 
friendship in such a way as to render democracy as open and as welcoming as possible. The 
notion of fraternity functions to exclude people unnecessarily from the political space, 
namely foreigners, who do not belong to the quasi-natural community, and women. In 
heightening the tensions within the inherited notion of friendship, Derrida attempts to 
relaunch democracy in such a way as to emphasize the universalism and the openness that 
are also important strands within the tradition (113). 
Up to this point, I have been discussing Haddad’s argument for what I have called his 
descriptive thesis. This argument, as I have suggested, is original, philosophically fruitful, and 
most importantly, convincing. But Haddad wants to do more than to describe democracy to 
come as oriented toward a past that must be inherited: he wants to argue as well that 
deconstructive analysis justifies our inheriting democracy in ways that heighten its tensions 
and that emphasize the value of openness to transformation. It is not merely the case, in 
other words, that Derrida in fact prefers to inherit democracy in this way; it is also the case 
that Derrida has compelling normative reasons grounding that preference. Haddad advances 
his argument for this position in the fourth chapter, taking as his foil the argument that 
Martin Hägglund makes against the normative dimension of deconstruction in his Radical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Jacques Derrida, Rogues: Two Essays on Reason, trans. Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Nass (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2005), 26. Quoted in Haddad, 53. 
2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics in The Complete Works of Aristotle: Revised Oxford Translation, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan 
Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1155a.21-28. 
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Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life. 3  Hägglund’s argument can be represented 
straightforwardly: deconstruction reveals irreducible undecidability, and this undermines the 
possibility of any fixed ideals in terms of which normative claims could receive their ultimate 
justifications: “to look for such justifications in Derrida’s work is to misunderstand the level 
on which his analyses operate. Derrida does not offer solutions to political problems or 
normative guidelines for how to approach them.”4 If democracy occupies a privileged 
position in Derrida’s political philosophy, it is because it is more descriptively accurate than 
its rivals, bringing to light most explicitly the openness that no political system can eliminate 
(78). 
Haddad, of course, is unconvinced by this argument. He believes he can locate a ground 
for normative commitments in the simple fact that the languages in which we carry out acts 
of inheritance are irreducibly value laden. Language “remains not as a neutral medium, but as 
one that comes already differentially infused with contours of value, formed from the 
particular sedimented history that precedes it. This terrain exerts forces structuring processes 
of evaluation…” (95). “Democracy,” as it happens, is a term that carries a positive value in 
our political tradition, and so Derrida cannot take it up in a merely constative, value-neutral 
way. To argue otherwise, as Hägglund does, is to exhibit an indefensible “indifference to 
language” (96). 
But this argument, it seems to me, can succeed only by moving the goalposts. In 
showing how Derrida’s analyses must be more than merely constative, Haddad establishes 
only that Derrida is faced with specifically practical questions. Of course the sedimented 
values of the tradition recommend some ways of inheriting while discouraging others. But 
this is not enough to establish that Derrida’s choices are justified. It seems to me that 
Haddad is treating the problem of normativity here as if it were the solution to the problem. 
Haddad is certainly right to argue that our having to inherit traditions in value-laden language 
puts certain normative questions in play for us. But then the whole problem is precisely to 
discover which way of inheriting we ought to pursue. And the fact that we inherit within 
value-laden languages cannot solve that problem. As Christine M. Korsgaard has argued, the 
normative problem arises for us because we can distance ourselves from what purport to be 
reasons for action; from the perspective that this distance grants, we can ask whether the 
purported reasons really are good reasons.5 We solve the normative problem when we 
discover reasons for action from which we can no longer get a reflective distance. Applying 
this idea in the Derridean context, we can see that the necessity of inheriting a tradition—as 
opposed to being determined by it wholly passively—sets us at a distance from values that 
present themselves as purported reasons for action. That is the problem of normativity. But 
nothing in the discourse of deconstruction gives us the resources to show that the values we 
inherit really do give us more than purported reasons for action. Haddad seems to 
acknowledge this point, arguing that deconstructive analyses can provide provisional 
justifications (96). But to have a provisional justification just is to have a normative problem. 
In order, finally, to illustrate how valuable the Derridean conception of inheritance is for 
our understanding of political life, but also how ethically problematic it can be, I would like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Haddad also examines in detail the normative argument advanced by Leonard Lawlor in This is Not Sufficient: 
An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). To examine 
this argument in detail, though, would take us too far afield. 
4 Martin Hägglund, Radical Atheism: Derrida and the Time of Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), 32. 
Quoted in Haddad, 77. 
5 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 93-94. 
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to examine it within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, about which Derrida 
himself had much to say. In Specters of Marx, Derrida characterizes the conflict as “the war 
for the ‘appropriation of Jerusalem,’” carried out in the name of different nationalisms 
competing for the same Promised Land.6 All nationalisms that are based on claims to a 
native soil, Derrida thinks, “not only sow hatred, not only commit crimes, they have no 
future, they promise nothing….”7 What Derrida seems to be calling for is a different way of 
inheriting the messianic tradition that informs not only the Jewish religion, but all three of 
the Abrahamic religions, and indeed all of human experience.8 To inherit in a way that 
emphasizes messianicity, in Derrida’s sense of the term, and that de-emphasizes nationalism 
is to become more welcoming to unanticipated possibilities of transformation and thus to 
“the event as justice.”9 This seems entirely salutary. But as Christopher Wise has argued, this 
way of inheriting can have the effect of obscuring morally salient features of situations and 
thus of reinforcing processes of closure and exclusion. By framing what is at issue in the 
conflict in terms of nationalism and hospitality, Derrida treats the wrongs committed by 
each side as symmetrical, neutralizing differences that are in fact very important. First of all, 
this way of presenting the issue places in the background all the forms of aggression, 
including economic aggression, that are not primarily motivated by religious or nationalist 
concerns.10 Insofar as the wrongs committed by both sides are all traced back to the same 
source, it appears as if both sides are guilty of the same wrongs. And second, Derrida’s way 
of inheriting obscures the historical circumstances that produced the conflict of nationalisms 
in the first place. Although both sides lay claim to Jerusalem, it is misleading to suggest that 
both sides are struggling to appropriate it, since it is the Israelis who have been occupying it in 
violation of international law. To abstract from this history is to treat the Israeli occupation 
of Jerusalem as a morally neutral fait accompli, and thus to reinforce the very processes of 
exclusion that deconstructive inheritance is supposed to undermine.11 
None of this to say that Derrida’s preference for relaunching the traditions he inherits in 
the direction of openness is bad. The point is just that it is not necessarily justifiable. 
Whether this kind of inheritance is good or bad remains an open question, which can only 
be decided case by case, based on careful consideration of the circumstances. What I believe 
the example of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brings to light is that a deconstructive 
discourse that emphasizes the value of hospitality can function, in certain circumstances at 
least, as a support for strongly inhospitable practices. 
Despite my reservations about Haddad’s explicitly normative argument, I believe that 
Derrida and the Inheritance of Democracy is an excellent book, advancing an original, thought-
provoking thesis about one of the most important ideas in the later Derrida’s political 
philosophy. Haddad’s argumentation is extraordinarily clear throughout—which is no small 
feat for a text on Derrida—and grounded in a thorough knowledge of the relevant literature. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy 
Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 58. Hereafter Specters. 
7 Ibid., 169. 
8 John D. Caputo, ed., Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1997), 22-23. “Every time I open my mouth, I am promising something…. So the promise is 
not just one speech act among others; every speech act is fundamentally a promise. This universal structure of 
the promise, of the expectation for the future, for the coming, and the fact that this expectation of the coming 
has to do with justice—that is what I call the messianic structure.” 
9 Derrida, Specters, 168. 
10 Christopher Wise, Derrida, Africa, and the Middle East (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 52. 
11 Ibid., 54. 
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This book should be accessible to graduate students, although probably not to most 
undergraduate students. I would recommend it strongly to anyone interested in the later 
Derrida or in contemporary political philosophy. 
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